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Introduction
Not too long ago, PBS aired a documentary called Taken for a Ride. Early in the
program, the narrator promised that the video would tell "the story about how things got
the way they are.... Between 1926 and 1936, they methodically destroyed the rails."

1

The "they" in this story was General Motors, Standard Oil, Firestone Tire, and others.
Although reviewers of Taken for a Ride referred to it as "a tragically impo1tant
story" (James Kunstler) and "an important piece of American history" (Howard Zinn), no
one claimed that the story it told about GM and the others was a story that had not been
heard before.2 Indeed, within a year of the film's release, Jane Holtz Kay had published

Asphalt Nation: How the Automobile Took over America and How We Can Take It Back,
in which she pronounced Ford, GM, and Chrysler the "trio [that] drove the era of excess
and consumerism. "3
"Sold by General Motors salesmen whose maneuvers would earn opprobrium,"
says Kay, " the motor bus spelled trouble for mass transit. In turn, the replacement of
streetcars by buses and the need for more transfers made suburbanites buy more cars. In
concert the truck, the bus, the multiplying motorcar, and cheap gas powered the auto age
and undermined the monopoly of the rails." 4

Taken for a Ride and Asphalt Nation are only the most recent voices to be raised
in a decades-long protest against the automobile and its replacement of those proud and
venerable conveyors of humanity: the electric railway streetcars. The villain in this

I Taken for a Ride, produced and directed by James Klein and Martba Olson, 52 min. , Hohokus, NY: New
Day Films, 1996.
2
For these and other reviews, see "New Day Films- Taken for a Ride," webpage accessed on November
12, 1998 Q1ttp://www.newday.com/films/Taken_for_a_ Ride.html].
3
Jane Holtz Kay, Asphalt Nation: How the Automobile Took over America and How W e Cn11 Tnke It
Back (New York: Crown Publishers, 1997), p. 171.
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tragedy, the one responsible for tearing asunder America's railway tracks, is General
Motors - General Motors and its accomplices, the oil, tire, and truck companies.
Or, so the story goes. This is the Great American Conspiracy Myth, perpetuated
year after year by storytellers and keepers of the public conscience. The storytellers
include politicians such as Robert and Edward Kennedy and San Francisco's Mayor
Joseph Alioto. They include activists such as Ralph Nader and journalists. such as
Jonathan Kwitny,5 writing for Hmper 's Magazine , and Jane Holtz Kay, architecture critic
for The Nation. They include scholars, such as George Smerk, David St. Clair, and
Glenn Yago. 6 And, of course, there is Hollywood, with its 1988 film, Who Framed

Roger Rabbit?, in which the fictitious Cloverleaf Company is blamed for buying up Los
Angeles's Pacific Electric Red Cars, destroying the "the best public transportation system
in the world."7
In her book, Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making, Brandeis
University professor Deborah Stone explains that the conspiracy myth is a variant of
what she refers to as the "control story." Control stories are symbolic representations
used to define political problems. According to Stone, there are several types of story
that are told as a means of problem definition. Stories of decline, for example, tell us that

4

Kay, p. 174.
Jonathan Kwitny. "The Great Transportation Conspiracy,'' Harper's Magazine (February 1981 ): 14-21 .
6
George M. Smerk, Urban Transportation: The Federal Role (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1965); George M. Smerk, ed., Readings in Urban Transportation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1968); David J. St. Clair, "The Motorization and Decline of Urban Public Transit, 1935- 1950," Journal of
Economic History 41 (September 1981 ): 579-600; The Motorization ofAmerican Cities (New York:
Praeger, 1986); and Glenn Yago, The Decline o/Transit: Urban Transportation in German and U.S. Cities.
1900-1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
7
Who Framed Roger Rabbit?, directed by Robert Zemeckis and produced by Steven Spielberg, et al., I 03
min., Touchstone Pictures and Amblin Entertainment, 1988.
5
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"in the beginning, things were pretty good. But they got worse. In fact, right now. they
are nearly intolerable. Something must be done."8
Stories of helplessness and control, Stone says, go like this: "The situation is bad.
We have always believed that the situation was out of our control, something we had to
accept but could not influence."9 Stone maintains that stories of control have at their root
notions about liberty and our ability to control our own fate. As a variant of the control
story, the conspiracy story "claims to show that all along control has been in the hands of
a few who have used it to their benefit and concealed it from the rest of us ....
Conspiracy stories always reveal that harm has been deliberately caused or knowingly
tolerated, and so evoke horror and moral condemnation. Their ending always takes the
form of a call to wrest control from the few who benefit at the expense of the many .'' 10
The GM Conspiracy Myth is the quintessential example of the conspiracy story.
But what is its purpose? What role does it play in public consciousness raising and
policy agenda setting? Why - even after numerous scholarly debunkings of the GM
Conspiracy Myth - does it continue to entice?
This paper will review the history of the GM Conspiracy Myth, as well as what
legal theorists refer to as "the facts in the case." The legal explanation of what really
happened goes only so far, though. The whole story about the decline of mass transit in
the U.S. is a story about the failure of public policy and about conflict an1ong competing
constituencies in the transportation policy process. This paper will very briefly discuss

8

Stone. Deborah. Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making. New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, 1997, p. 138.
9
Stone, p. 142.
0
' Stone, p. 143.
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this fai lure and this conflict and will then conclude with a consideration of - or at Jeast a
hypothesis for - the endurance of the GM Conspiracy Myth.
History of the GM Lawsuits and the Conspiracy Mvth
In 1947, a CaJifornia grand jury indicted the following nine defendants with
violating Sections I and II of the Sherman Antitrust Act:
1. General Motors Corporation, on its own behalf and as successor to Yellow
Truck & Coach
2. Mack Manufacturing Company
3. Phillips Petroleum Company
4. Standard Oil Company of California
5. Federal Engineering Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Standard Oil
6. Firestone Tire and Rubber Company
7. National City Lines (NCL), holding company for 46 transit companies in 16
states
8. Pacific City Lines, since dissolved, but previously a subsidiary of NCL and
the operator ofNCL companies in California, Washington, and Utah
9. American City Lines, an NCL subsidiary operating companies in large
metropolitan areas
The indictment resulted in the initiation of a civil and criminal case. Two years
after the California grand jury returned the indictment, the cases were transferred to
Chicago, where hearings began.
The defendants were tried in circuit court on two counts, neither of which
involved a conspiracy to destroy the country's mass transit system. The first count
charged that the defendants had violated Section I of the Sherman Act by conspiring,
since 1937, to secure control of a significant number of transit-providing companies and
to eliminate competition in the saJe of motor buses and supplies to companies controlled
by National City Lines, a GM subsidiary. The jury was unable to substantiate these
charges, and the defendants were acquitted on this count.

6
The second count charged that the defendants had violated Section II of the
Sherman Act by conspiring to eliminate competition in the sale of motor buses and
supplies to National City Lines companies. The defendants were convicted on this count.
GM was fined $5,000 and its treasurer was fined $1. GM appealed.
In 1951 , the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Court upheld the criminal
conviction. Within four years, the civil case concluded, with the judge ruling that no
fmther remedy from GM would be necessary. It was 1955, and one might have thought
the matter had ended there.
However, several events transpired to bring the accusations against General
Motors back to the public's attention. In 1956, the federal government passed the
Federal-Aid Highway Act, ushering in four decades oflnterstate highway building.
Meanwhile, by the 1960s, urban coalitions were demanding that attention be paid to the
multitude of crises sweeping the nation 's cities. Choked by traffic congestion and mired
in racism, poverty, and despair, urban areas were losing their economic competitiveness
to the expanding suburbs. Urban mayors appealed to the federal government for
specifically urban responses.
Their appeal became more urgent after a series of commuter rail service
abandonments threatened to cripple several large east coast cities. 11 The federal
government responded first with the Housing Act of 1961, the first piece of legislation
dealing explicitly with mass transit. In an effo1t to stem the tide of commuter raiJ
abandonments, this Act inaugurated a small low-interest loan program for transit capital
acquisitions.

11

See Michael N. Danielson, Federal-Metropolitan Politics and the Commuter Crisis. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1965.
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In 1962, the Joint Report on Urban Mass Transportation was submitted to
President Kennedy. This report recognized that mass transit was in serious decline and
that. because transportation is a key factor in shaping America's cities, the federal
government should make aid available for mass transit, in part as a way to balance out the
billions of dollars allocated in 1956 for the Interstate freeways. Following the report, the
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 stated as a matter of federal policy the encouragement
and promotion of multimodal transportation - i.e. , mass transit.
The same year- 1962 - that under the Kennedy administration the federal
government first acknowledged the central role of mass transit in the viability of the
nation's cities, Attorney General Robert Kennedy brought a lawsuit against General
Motors, charging the company with monopolizing bus transportation. This case was
essentially a revisiting of the antitrust cases of the 1940s. Although the case was settled
with a consent decree in 1965, it brought GM back to the public's attention, in a much
more volatile and media-oriented era.
However much the resurrection of the GM accusations may have been pmely in
pursuit of political objectives, George Smerk imbued the cause with academic legitimacy.
In his 1965 Urban Transportation: The Federal Role and again in his 1968 Readings ;n

Urban Transportation, Smerk charged GM, National City Lines, and others with aiding
and abetting the decline of mass transit. 12
The Arab oil embargo of 1973 lent new urgency to the crisis in urban
transportation. In 1974 Senate hearings regarding the Industrial Reorganization Act,
Senator Edward M. Kennedy articulated what was perhaps a fear among some policy

12

Smerk, 1965, p. 50, and 1968, p. 32.
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makers that Americans might question the government's role in the urban transportation
cns1s:
I suppose it crosses their minds to question why there aren't adequate
means of transportation available to them and to millions of other
Americans ... The public is wondering whatever happened to the steam
engine or electric car. What happened to mass transit? Are all the
problems they are facing today merely the result of an Arab oil embargo?
Or shouldn' t we, in a country that is unsurpassed in technological
expe1iise, have been able to develop alternative means of transportation
... ?13

Senator Kennedy' s comments only hinted at what San Francisco' s Mayor Joseph
Alioto relayed to the Senate in even more direct terms. " I think it is fair to say," Alioto
testified, " that over the 40 years we have been talking about this that General Motors has
can-ied on a deliberate concerted action with the oil companies and the tire companies ...
for the purpose of destroying a vital form of competition; namely, electric rapid transit. " 14
The testimony continued:
Senator Roman L. Hruska: Was it General Motors and its bus building
capacity that really wrecked the streetcar system in America?
Alioto: I think, Senator, that the answer has got to be yes. The answer
has got to be yes because General Motors actually formed the
company together with the oil companies and the tire companies to
go in and buy out those streetcar systems, to then dismantle them,
and to substitute busses for them ... 15
Alioto, Kennedy, and others may have been influenced by the 1973 work of
antitrust attorney, Bradford Snell, American Ground Transport, which Snell wrote
through a grant he received from the Stern Fund of New York. Subsequently, Snell was

13

Edward M. Kennedy, Testimony in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, The industrial
Reorganization Act: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly on S. 1167, Part 3:
Ground Transportation Industries, 93rd Cong., 2d sess., 1974, p. 1775.
14
Joseph Alioto, Testimony in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, The Industrial
Reorganization Act: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly on S. 1167, Part 3:
Ground Transportation Industries, 93rd Cong., 2d sess., I974, p. 1786.
15
Testimony in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, The industrial Reorganization Act:
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly on S. I 167, Part 3: Ground Transpo1tation
Industries, 93rd Cong., 2d sess., 1974, p. 1797.
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invited to join the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monopoly as a staff member. American Ground Transport was included as an appendix
to the Senate Committee's hearings on the Industrial Reorganization Act and remains the
most widely relied-upon document in the public indictment of General Motors and the
conspiracy myth regarding the demise of public transport.
Snell blamed the decline of mass transit in the U.S. on a targeted program,
spearheaded by General Motors, with the goal of "substitution of buses for
passenger trains, streetcars and trolley buses; monopolization of bus production;
and diversion of riders to automobiles." Snell argued that General Motors and its
subsidiary company National City Lines were responsible for " the destruction of
more than l 00 electric surface rail systems in 45 cities including New York,
Philadelphia, Baltimore, St. Louis, Oakland, Salt Lake City and Los Angeles."

16

The rationale behind General Motors' substitution-and-diversion
campaign, according to Snell , stemmed from the company's realization of "the
capability of electric transportation to compete with automobiles .... [GM]
realized that as long as people had adequate mass transportation they would11't
buy the product that GM was fundamentally interested in selling." Snell's basic
thesis was that GM conspired with bus operators, manufacturers, and suppliers in
order to replace competitive electric transit vehicles with less competitive motor
buses, thereby causing the riding public to become so dissatisfied with mass
transit that they were diverted to GM's primary product, the automobile. "The
only way to bring about a situation where it sold more cars," Snell asserted, "was

10
to eliminate rail alternatives and to supplant them with buses which were
unattractive." 17
Some academic work during the 1980s continued to support the GM conspiracy
thesis. In 1984, Glenn Yago relied heavily on Snell in arguing that through GM and
National City Lines, "American street railways were dismantled .... Urban rail transit
was replaced by motor buses, which were to be replaced by cars." 18 David St. Clair, an
economist, argued in 1981 and again in 1986 that in order for Snell's conspiracy theory to
be substantiated, it must be shown that there was in fact something to conspire about; that
is, it must be shown that motor buses were inferior vehicles. St. Clair concludes by
generally supporting the conspiracy theory after providing evidence that he's convinced
proves that motor buses were indeed inferior.
Despite scholarship done by Scott Bottles, Sy Adler, and others in the late 1980s
and 1990s refuting the conspiracy thesis, 19 it has continued to prevail, particularly in the
popular media, as the recent PBS video and the comments in Asphalt Nation demonstrate.
Before returning to the question of why the myth has persisted, this paper now turns to a
discussion of what in fact did occur, both in terms of GM's actions and in terms of the
transit industry in general.

16

Bradford Snell, American Ground Transport ( 1973), reproduced as an appendix to U.S. Congress, Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, The Industrial Reorganization Act: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Antitrust and Monopoly on S. 1167, Part 4A, 93rd Cong., 2d sess., 1974, A-2, A-29.
17
Bradford Snell, Testimony in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, The industrial
Reorganization Act: Hearings before the Subco111111illee on Antitrust and Monopoly on S. 1167, Part -IA,
93rd Cong., 2d sess., 1974, 1839.
18
Yago, 58.
19
Scott L. Bottles, Los Angeles and the Automobile: The Making ofthe Modern City (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1987); Sy Adler, "The Transformation of the Pacific Electric Railway: Bradford Snell,
Roger Rabbit, and the Politics of Transportation in Los Angeles," Urban Affairs Quarterly 27 (September
1991): 51-86; Martha J. Bianco, " The Decline of Transit-Corporate Conspiracy or Failure of Public
Policy?: The Case of Portland, Oregon," Journal of Policy History, Vol. 9, No. 4, Winter 1997: 450-474.
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The "Facts in the Case"
Until 1943 , General Motors engaged in all of its involvement in the bus industry
through its controlled subsidiary, Yellow Truck & Coach Manufacturing. In the early
1930s Yell ow' s management
conceived the idea of motorizing streetcar companies in small cities. For
some years streetcar companies in small urban communities had been
losing money and this, coupled with the depression following 1929, had
resulted in depreciation of rolling stock and an inability on the part of
streetcar companies adequately to serve the public. 20
However, the legal records continue, Yellow apparently had difficulty in
persuading the power companies that owned the streetcar operations "to motorize and
give up their streetcars in order to give better service and at a profit." In 1932. "Yellow,
therefore, decided that the only way this new market for buses could be created was for it
to finance the conversion from streetcars to buses in some small cities .... [Yellow's
management decided to] authorize the incorporation of a holding company with a capital
investment of $300,000." The holding company that was thereby formed , United Cities
Motor Transit (UCMT), began by making investments in small transit companies in
Kalamazoo and Saginaw, Michigan, and in Springfield, Ohio. "In each case, Yellow
successfully motorized the city and, having demonstrated the feasibility of using small
buses, turned the management over to other interests and liquidated its investment." 21

20

Exhibit 6, Excerpt from Hearing before Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee entitled " A study of the
Antitrust Laws," December 8, 1955, Pt. 8: Statement of Facts from the Court Records Regarding General
Motors in the National City Lines Cases, in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, The
Ind us trial Reorganization Act: Hearings bef ore the Subcommitlee on Antitrust and Monopoly on S 11 67,
Part 3, Ground Transportation Industries, 93rd Cong., 2d sess., 1974, 1820.
21
Ibid.
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National City Lines and the Requirements Contracts
National City Lines (NCL) was organized in 1936, "for the purpose of taking over
the controlling interest in certain operating companies engaged in city bus transpo11ation
and overland bus transportation." At tl1is point, it appears that the manufacturers' and
suppliers' involvement with NCL was in the form of loans, as opposed to direct
investment.22i
Direct investment in NCL by GM- through Yellow - did not occur until 1939.
This investment in NCL - and the turning point in the relationship from a legal
standpoint - occurred after E. Roy Fitzgerald, the president ofNCL, approached Yellow,
explaining that he wanted to expand NCL but needed additional financing. An
arrangement was agreed upon that resulted in purchase requirements contracts. These
requirements contracts specified that, in exchange for NCL' s promise to purchase certain
percentages of new equipment - and refrain from purchasing equipment not using
gasoline or diesel fuel - GM and the suppliers would give financial assistance to NCL by
purchasing preferred stock from NCL at prices in excess of the prevailing market
prices. 23
The contracts also specified that thereafter the operating companies would not
purchase any new equipment using means of propulsion other than gas. In the early
1940s, this clause was changed to permit the purchase and use of diesel equipment. 24

22

Ibid., 1821-1822
Exhibit 2, "Findings of the United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, United States v. National
City Lines (Criminal Conviction), 186 F2d 562, upheld on January 31 , 1951 , in U.S. Congress, Senate
Committee on the Jud iciary, The Industrial Reorganization Act: Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Antitnist and Monopoly on S. 1167, Part 3, Ground Transportation Industries, 93rd Cong.. 2d sess., 1974.
1874.
24
Exhibit 6, 1821-1822; Jonathan Kwitny, "The Great Transportation Conspiracy," Harper's Magazine,
February 1981 , 20.
23
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This provision effectively ruled out the use of electric buses or modernized track-tied
electric streetcars, both of which were fairly popular fonns of mass transit at the time.
Although the judge in the 1949 court case would find that "it is not unlawful to
make a requirements contract,"25 it is nonetheless precisely this contract that resulted in
so much controversy over GM's relationship with NCL and the subsequent charges that
this was a conspiratorial relationship that brought about the destruction of urban mass
transit.
Public Policy and the Decline of Transit
The Modernization Mandate
GM did not become involved with mass transit through a bus-conversion
campaign until the 1930s. At that time there was a growing demand for new mass
transit vehicles. By 1935 the majority of electric streetcars operated by transit
companies in the U.S. were at least twenty-five years old. Industry analysis
revealed that in 1934, a twenty-year-old streetcar was well past its prime.26 Many
transit companies during this period were being required by their franchises to
spend large sums of money on major modernization programs.
By the late 1930s, there were three alternative mass transit vehicles
available for replacement and modernization purposes. any of which would be an
improvement over the existing old stock, which was slow, uncomfortable,

25
26

Exhibit 6, 1825.
Edward A. Roberts, " Life Expectancy of Street Cars," Transit Journal 80 (September 1936): 305.
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dilapidated, and unreliable. 27 One alternative was the motor bus, which relied on
a gasoline-powered engine until the mid-30s.
The adoption of the diesel-electric engine in 1936 brought a great
improvement in efficiency over the gasoline bus. Efficiency was even further
improved when in 1939 the first diesel buses equipped with an automatic
hydraulic transmission were put into service in New York. Only at this point was
the motor bus coming to be seen within the transit industry as a strongly
competitive transit vehicle.
A second alternative was the trackless trolley - essentially an electric bus,
obtaining its power from an electric overhead. The first major installation of
trolleys occurred in 1928 in Salt Lake City. Trolleys were widely seen as
spacious, comfortable, clean, and quiet.
A third alternative was the modern version of the electric streetcar. This
vehicle was the result of six years of research by the Electric Railway Presidents'
Conference Committee (hence the moniker, "PCC car"), which culminated in
1935 with the production of a spacious, comfortable, light, and - most
importantly - fast electric streetcar. Equipped with between fifty-four and sixty
seats, the PCC car was the largest of the three transit vehicles.
It must be remembered that when GM became involved in bus conversion
in 1932, the PCC car had not yet been invented. As for the motor bus, it was
certainly not at its most competitive - neither diesel nor hydraulic transmission

27

For a full discussion of the history and characteristics of the three mass transit alternatives, see John
Anderson Miller, Fares, Please!: A Popular Histo1y o/Trolleys, Horsecars, Streetcars, Buses, Elevateds,
and Subways (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1960), reprint (New York: D. Appleton-Century
Company, Inc., 1941 ).
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technology was yet available. The trackless trolley was in many ways the most
attractive available vehicle option in terms of speed and comfort; on the other
hand, it was essentially an unproven mass transit vehicle, rather expensive, and
thus a risky investment. By 1936, when National City Lines was organized, the
PCC car had been available for about one year and was showing great promise.
Trackless trolleys were also proving to be strong competitors. GM, meanwhile,
was just beginning to make headway in the use of the diesel engine for motor
buses.
The "Inferior" Motor Bus
In most instances, when transit companies first put the motor bus into
operation in a city, they did so on routes that had had no prior transit service.
There was wide consensus within the transit industry that slreetcars were most
appropriate for heavily traveled lines, trolleys for lighter lines, and motor buses
for the lightest lines.28 Thus, the motor bus was introduced primarily on lighter
routes. Many of these were routes that transit companies might even have chosen
not to serve at all, had they been able to make such a routing decision. The fact is
that transit companies faced demands either by their riding constituency or by the
regulatory bodies to provide unprofitable service.
Transit companies were politically and often legally unable to refuse to
provide unprofitable service. The motor bus allowed them to operate such service
at the least loss, since it would have been entirely prohibitive for them to extend
streetcar tracks or install trolleys on suburbanizing routes, where they were
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required to provide service. Even if the cost of trackage had not been an issue which it clearly was not in the case of trolleys or in areas where usable tracks
already existed - it was not considered economically feasible for companies to
equip a lightly traveled line with a $14,000 trolley or streetcar when a motor bus
could be purchased for a fraction of the price. 29 Especially in the years
surrounding the Depression, followed by the exigencies of WWII , transit
companies making investment decisions were not afforded the luxury of thinking
in terms of the longer life and slower depreciation of the trolleys and streetcars
when compared to the motor bus. In addition, it must be remembered that during
all of this time - except for the war years - the total number of transit passengers
was decreasing while the total number of route miles was increasing.
There are a number of reasons for the decline of ridership numbers. Most
companies began to see ridership decline beginning in about 1920. It is important
to note that the decline was occurring in off-peak hours; transit's peak-hour
ridership remained relatively stable. Off-peak traffic fell as decentralization
occurred, making it increasingly unnecessary to travel into the city center for
services, shopping, and entertainment. The availability of the automobile also
decreased off-peak traffic, because families used their auto instead of transit for
pleasure travel. It is unlikely that ridership decline during the 1920s was
28

" Industry to Replace 70% of Old Equipment in Next Five Years, Transit Journal 80 (September 15,
1936): 345; "Looking at all Three," Transit Journal 80 (September 15, 1936): 346. Indeed, NCL did
oferate a mixed system in both Los Angeles and St. Louis.
2
Donald E. Dewees, "The Decline of the American Street Railways," Transit Quarterly 24 (October
1970): 574; Mac Sebree and Paul Ward, Transit's Stepchild: The Trolley Coach, Interurbans Special No.
59, Vol. 30, No. I, Summer 1973 (Cerritos, Calif.: Ira L. Switt, 1973), 60; " Tomorrow's Street Car,"
Transit Journal 80 (July 1936): 219. Costs for vehicles varied, depending on whether the installation was a
first installation, on the capacity of the vehicle, on the size of the order, and so on. Estimates for first
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primarily the result of increasing ridership dissatisfaction with any one type of
transit vehicle, although dissatisfaction combined with the availability of an
alternative - the automobile - certainly contributed.
At any rate, evidence reveals that the motor bus was becoming the least
popular and the least profitable transit vehicle, but it was also, in many situations,
the least expensive to purchase and to operate and thus the only means of
responding to demands for service on lightly traveled routes. Streetcars or
trolleys clearly would have sustained even greater losses on those same routes.
Had it been politically feasible, the transit companies would either have
discontinued service altogether on these lines or the public sector would have
provided some sort of subsidy or at least relief from franchise obligations.
However, in most cases neither of these remedies was available until the 1950s.
Eventually, however, the unprofitable motor bus was installed on the
majority of transit lines, not just suburban, crosstown, or feeder. The implication
from Bradford Snell is that GM and the other defendants coerced or otherwise
unscrupulously caused transit companies to implement widespread conversion to
the inferior motor bus. This implication is the crux of the conspiracy theory.
Another explanation for widespread conversion, of course, is that the cost
of installing streetcars or trolleys continued to rise relative to expected revenues.
There were two reasons for this. One, ridership continued lo decline and hence a
greater percentage of lines became " lightly traveled." Two, trackage and other
existing equipment was in a terribly deteriorated state by the mid- l 940s,

trolley coaches range from $9,000 to $14,000. Estimates for first PCC cars range from $14,000 to $15,000.
Estimates for motor buses range from $1,000 to $10,000.
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especially as a result of the great increase in demand during WWII; the cost of
renovating these fixed investments would have been exceedingly high. So,
conversion to motor buses continued to present itself as the least costly response
to demands for modernization and service expansion.
The Theory of Technology Foreclosure
Transit policy analyst David Jones argues that the activities of GM and
NCL were directed toward foreclosure of a rival technology - that is, electric
transit, whether trackless trolley or trackbound PCC streetcar. Jones notes that
"most street railways were understandably reluctant to adopt a technology [diesel]
that was viewed as essentially unproven in sustained urban operation." 30 This
reluctance is confirmed by 1955 testimony by GM vice president Roger M . Kyes,
who stated that the " introduction [of the diesel engine by GM] was greeted with
skepticism and indifference. In the first year only seven operators were willing to
use our new powerplant. "

31

As Jones explains, a reluctant market " posed a no-win situation for diesel
bus manufacturers - General Motors, Mack, and Twin Coach.... To break this
logjam, General Motors joined with an oil and rubber company to capitalize a
transit management organization [NCL] with the financing necessary to acquire
failing streetcar systems and reequip them with diesel buses." 32

30

David M. Jones, Urban Transit Policy: An Economic and Political History (Englewood Cliffs. NJ:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1985), 62.
31
Roger M. Kyes, Statement in Exhibit 6, Excerpt from Hearing before Antitrust and Monopoly
Subcommittee entitled "A Study of the Antitrust Laws," December 8, 1955, Pt. 8: Statement of Facts from
the Court Records Regarding General Motors in 1he National City Lines Cases, in U.S. Congress, Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, The Industrial Reorganization Act: Hearings before the S11bco111millee on
Antitrust and Monopoly on S. 1167, Part 3, Ground Transportation Industries, 93rd Cong., 2d sess., 1829.
32
Jones, Urban Transit Policy, 62.
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In other words, the technology-foreclosure theory maintains. in order for
GM and other bus manufacturers and suppliers to be successful in developing a
market for diesel buses, they had to carry out an aggressive campaign to do so.
Such a campaign required working together to foreclose competitive technologies
- i.e., electric vehicles.
Snell and other conspiracy theorists take the technology-foreclosure
explanation a step further, arguing that the ultimate goal was not merely
foreclosure of a rival mass transit Jechnology, but foreclosure of a rival
transportation mode: " In the course of events," says Snell, GM " became
committed to the displacement of rail transportation by diesel buses and,
ultimately, to their displacement by automobiles."

33

If one dismisses Snell's argument and accepts instead the teclmology
foreclosure explanation, the question still remains as to why the transit firms were
unable to resist the bus manufacturers' aggressive campaign to create a market for
diesel technology.
The Myth of the Simple Linear Equation: Improve Service and Profits Will Rise
Transit companies had very little bargaining power with respect to their
suppliers. By the 1930s and 1940s, most companies were saddled by a very
heavy debt load. As has been shown above, companies were at the same time
under immense pressure by regulatory agencies to expand and improve transit
service. Most regulatory agencies assumed that if transit agencies would improve
service, ridership would increase, and the financial difficulties would disappear.
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This assumption, that through modernization and service improvements, a
transit company could increase ridership and hence revenues had been standard
among city officials throughout the nation for decades. However, this policy
assumption conflicted with the historical facts of the transit industry's operation
as a regulated monopoly, being subjected to increasing demands and simultaneous
revenue losses through ridership attrition. It also ignored the effect of
suburbanization on ridership attrition. Finally, these modernization policies
conflicted with other transportation policies implemented at the local level. It is
in this way that public policy contributed significantly to the decline of transit.
Conclusions
By 1940, according to Jones, seventy-five U.S. companies were operating
680 diesel buses, "primarily of General Motors manufacture." Jones maintains
that
the insidious conspiracy designed to destroy mass transit and stimulate the
sale of automobiles ... can more accurately be characterized as a corporate
strategy to sell diesel buses by creating first a pilot market and later a solesource supplier relationship with effectively captive consumers.
He concludes that
the most impo1tant consequence was not the displacement of streetcar
systems ... [but rather] the dominance of a single manufacturer in the
diesel bus market and the preemption of routes and markets that might
have been more economically served by the electric trolleybus. 34
The transit business had become increasingly unprofitable, and
automobiles clearly appeared to be the future of transportation. Even though
motor buses were uneconomical in the long run, in the short run, they were less
34

Jones, Urban Transit Policy, 63.

21

expensive to purchase and operate than either electric trolleys or modern electric
streetcars - and in the struggling transit industry, the short run was all that
mattered.
That the inferiority in terms of profitability as a mass transit vehicle was
probably known by GM, Mack, and other diesel-bus manufacturers and
automobile interests does not in and of itself substantiate the conspiracy theory
that holds that these companies wanted to destroy mass transit in order to
facilitate the ascendancy of the automobile. In addition, as has been discussed,
transit industry operators and manufacturers understood that the unprofitability of
the motor bus was due to the low-density routes it served.
The failure of public policy should be assigned as much blame - if not
more than - the machinations of the diesel-bus industry for the substitution of
inferior motor buses. It was, after all, the regulatory agencies' modernization
requirements that contributed to transit companies' unmanageable debt load and
inability to adapt in a constrained purchasing environment. It was also franchise
requirements for service expansion that prompted widespread installation of buses
in the first place and that made their continued purchase economical to transit

companies in light of their other debts and obligations. Modernization
requirements were in many cases the straw that broke the camel's back, forcing
transit companies to provide service improvements and extensions that were
economically so prohibitive that the companies had no choice but to implement
full-scale motorization.
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Public policy also encouraged expansion of the automobile industry. The
highway planning of this period is the prime example of how public policy
continued to accommodate and facilitate the automobile. As far as mass transit
was concerned, there was wide consensus that motor buses could easily operate
on the great new superhighways; electric streetcars and trolleys could not.

It is important to remember, though, that motorization and automobile
accommodation had been central to transportation policy and planning since the
1920s. Mass transit's decline had begun even earlier; in most cities, ridership and
profits peaked in 1919 and fell steadily thereafter. It seems more accurate to say
that the motorization campaign and auto accommodation in general contributed to
the continuing decline of transit. The roots of this decline, however, predate GM
and NCL and lie in the formative period when the first social and legal contracts
were entered into between the transit industry and its various constituents - the
regulatory bodies, labor, and the ridership.
Chief among these contracts was the franchise, which was the mechanism
tlu·ough which the public sector involved itself in mass transit policy-making.
The franch ise regulated transit as a monopoly long after the industry had ceased
to enjoy monopoly privileges such as exclusivity. Instead, the franchise served to
restrict the industry and to overwhelm it with burdensome obligations.
An adversarial relationship between the transit companies and their

regulators had developed early on, causing city officials involved with making
decisions regarding transportation policy to be all the more insensitive to industry
constraints. Transit companies were compelled, however, to comply with city
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policies and requirements, regardless of how much these conflicted with the other
demands faced by the industry. The result was an industry that was incapable of
meeting the changing transportation needs of a decentralized, automobiledependent urban population. It is in this way that public policy contributed to the
decline of urban mass transit, in a way that preceded and persisted beyond GM's
involvement.
Conspiracy Myth as Strategy Tool
To come back, then, to the question raised earlier: Why does the
conspiracy myth persist?
As this paper has suggested, the emergence and reemergence of the GM
conspiracy myth has coincided with periods of urban transportation policy crisis,
as were evidenced during the urban strife of the 1960s and the Arab oil embargo
in the 1970s.
The retrenchment of the federal government toward urban transportation
policy during the 1980s only served to fuel the agenda of citizen activists,
particularly among environmental groups. CBS's 60 Minutes aired a segment
sympathetic toward the conspiracy thesis in late 1988 - revealing that the myth
could still be called upon to spark public dialogue.
1988 was also the year that Hollywood released the film, Who Framed
Roger Rabbit? This segment of dialogue reveals the film ' s subplot about a

corporate conspiracy to destroy transit:
Jessica:
Doom:

What are you talking about? There's no road past
Toontown.
Not yet. Several months ago, I had the good
providence to stumble upon this plan of the City
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Valiant:
Doom:

Valiant:
Doom:

Valiant:
Doom:

Council's. A construction plan of epic proportions.
They're calling it - a freeway!
Freeway? What the hell's a freeway?
Eight lanes of shimmering cement running from
here to Pasadena. Smooth, safe, fast. Traffic jams
will be a thing of the past.
So that's why you killed Acme and Maroon - for
this freeway? I don't get it.
Of course not. You lack vision. I see a place where
people get on and off the freeway. On and off. Off
and on. All day, all night. Soon where Toontown
once stood will be a string of gas stations,
inexpensive motels, restaurants that serve rapidlyprepared food, tire salons, automobile dealerships,
and wonderful , wonderful billboards reaching as far
as the eye can see. My God, it'll be beautiful.
Come on. Nobody's gonna drive this lousy freeway
when they can take the Red Car for a nickel.
Oh, they'll drive. They'll have to. You see. I bought
the Red Car so I could dismantle it.

Shortly after the Roger Rabbit and the 60 Minutes segment, the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990 and then the Intermodal Surface Transportation
Efficiency Act of 1991 were passed. Such pieces of legislation provided the
policy response to the problems articulated by many environmental activists, as
well as by new urban coalitions unimpressed with the Reagan administration ' s
deemphasis of urban issues - problems symbolized in the rhetoric of the
conspiracy myth.
Stone says that the articulation of policy problems usually takes a
narrative, or story, form. There is. she says, a beginning, a middle, and an end.
More importantly for our purposes here, there are typically "heroes and villains
and innocent victims, and they pit the forces of evil against the forces of good."35
It is not difficult to identify the villains and innocent victims in the GM
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conspiracy story. The heroes are harder to identify, since the narrative always
ends dismaJly: streetcar systems are dismantled and trolleys are thrown into junk
heaps, and the pollution-spewing, sprawl-inducing automobile chugs into the
sunset. No one lives happily ever after.
Until, that is, public policy comes to the rescue. Like a knight in shining
armor, the hero of this story is the policy actor - whether politician, journalist.
citizen activist, or public intellectual - who is able to hold out hope and elicit
confidence in that hope that it is possible to "wrest control from the few who
benefit at the expense of the many"36 - in other words, to vanquish GM (and all
that GM stands for) and restore power to the victims - erstwhile straphangers.
The purpose of the conspiracy story, as with all stories of control. is lo
serve as a catalyst to action - specifically, policy action. They impart fear and. at
the same time, hope. They define a policy problem and suggest, at least
implicitly, a course of action. Stone says:
Policy stories are tools of strategy. Policy makers as well as interest
groups often create problems (in the artistic sense) as a context for the
actions they want to take. This is not to say that they actually cause harm
and destruction so they will have something to do, but that they represent
the world in such as way as to make themselves, their skills, and their
favorite course of action necessary. 37
The GM conspiracy myth, understood in this way, makes a great deal of
sense. It becomes irrelevant that GM did or did not cause or even contribute to
the decline of mass transit in the U.S. What becomes compelling, from a larger
perspective, is the manner in which the GM story is used, the political and
economic climates in which it is most likely to emerge, and the types of policy
36
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initiatives under consideration during the periods in which the story is being told.
What should also intrigue us is the power of the myth to attract a following. In
this regard, the compelling nature of the myth 's villain - the General Motors
Corporation - speaks volumes. If we cannot cast GM, the producer and supplier
of automobiles, as the ultimate enemy, then we end up with a shocking and nearly
unfathomable alternative: What if the enemy is not the supplier, but rather the
consumer? What if, to paraplu·ase Oliver PeITy, we have met the enemy, and the
enemy is us?

'Exhibit 6, 1821-1822.
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